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Abstract: Engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contracting does not promote 17 
collaboration and thus, may not be suitable for building information modeling (BIM) projects. 18 
Joint-contract functions that combine contractual control, coordination, and contingency 19 
adaptability may positively influence the performance of these BIM-enabled projects. This 20 
study hypothesized that perceived fairness, calculative trust, relational trust, and positive 21 
outcomes of distrust influence the relationship between joint contract functions and BIM-22 
enabled project performance. It collected 252 observations from industry practitioners in EPC 23 
oil and gas projects and analyzed them using partial least squares structural equation modelling 24 
(PLS-SEM). The results show no direct effect of joint-contract functions on BIM-enabled EPC 25 
project performance but do show significant total and indirect relationship effects that are 26 
influenced by perceived fairness and relational trust. The findings contribute to construction 27 
contracting research by empirically showing how formal contracts focusing on joint-contract 28 
functions can influence BIM-enabled EPC project performance. The current findings also shed 29 
light on appropriate contract framing for BIM-enabled EPC project stakeholders, an area not 30 
explored in the previous literature.  31 
Keywords: Contract Functions, Control; Coordination; Contingency Adaptability; Trust; 32 




The use of building information modeling (BIM) has become prevalent in various industries. 37 
It is not only a digital representation used to plan, design, control, and maintain facilities, it 38 
also affects the conventional ways that project participants define their roles and collaborate 39 
(Liu et al. 2017). Several studies argue that conventional contracting—including the 40 
engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) approach—is not suitable for projects that 41 
implement BIM (e.g., Lee et al. 2018). The goals of EPC-contracting parties can conflict in the 42 
following sense. First, an owner aims to complete a project within a certain timeframe and 43 
budget and according to desired specifications, whereas a contractor aims to make the highest 44 
possible profit from the project (Berends 2007). The conflicting positions between the owner 45 
and the EPC contractor can give rise to opportunism, in which both parties do anything to 46 
realize higher gains, regardless of the expense to the other (Lu et al. 2016). In addition, the 47 
nature of EPC projects, which typically involve high asset specificity and uncertainties, further 48 
increases the possibility of opportunistic behaviors by the contracting parties (Lee et al. 2018). 49 
As such, EPC contracts grounded in transaction law (Williston and Lewis 1920) and in a 50 
transaction cost economics approach usually impose more thorough contractual obligations. 51 
On the one hand, more thorough contracts enable parties to minimize uncertainty and thus 52 
restrain potential opportunistic behaviors (Williamson 1985). On the other hand, the contracts 53 
can have detrimental effects on cooperation in a BIM work environment (Goshal and Moran 54 
1996; Wuyts and Geyskens 2005). The possibility of detrimental effects prompts the 55 
overarching question of what complementary approaches can best facilitate BIM 56 
implementation in EPC contracts. 57 
Prior research has demonstrated that formal contracts can restrain relational norms and may 58 
result in distrust between the parties (Malhotra and Murnighan 2002). However, formal 59 
contracts also have the potential to facilitate the development of close, cooperative 60 
relationships by better aligning the expectations of parties (Mayer 2007). Schepker et al. (2014) 61 
provided some important insights, including the observation that firms should focus on the 62 
functional approach in contracting to succeed in their transactions. There are three main 63 
contract functions in an exchange: control, coordination, and contingency adaptability 64 
(Eckhard and Mellewigt 2006). To protect the contracting parties, the control function defines 65 
tolerable behaviors and applicable sanctions in BIM implementation (Benaroch et al. 2016). It 66 
is also used to reduce transaction and administration costs (Teng et al. 2019). Contractual 67 
coordination aligns the expectations of contracting parties by harmonizing the resources and 68 
activities required for delivering BIM (Eckhard and Mellewigt 2006). In the context of this 69 
study, contingency adaptability (or “adaptation”) refers to the provisions or guidelines for 70 
handling unanticipated situations that arise from using BIM (Luo 2002). Formal contracts often 71 
describe a mutually agreed tolerance zone for handling unexpected circumstances and conflicts 72 
arising from using BIM. These can include solutions for delays that result from ineffective 73 
collaboration among team members (Li et al. 2019), data error, or data loss. These solutions 74 
and guidelines are included in engineering and construction contracts as independent terms 75 
(e.g., procedures for handling delays due to BIM imperfections) or as clauses related to specific 76 
areas (e.g., dispute resolutions, damages stemming from the use of BIM, etc.).  77 
In this paper, it is argued that BIM in EPC projects can be implemented more effectively 78 
through the lens of joint-contract functions. This approach enables firms to pay closer attention 79 
to all three functions of formal contracts to improve exchange efficiency. In related previous 80 
studies, Wang et al. (2017) investigated the impact of contractual control, coordination, and 81 
adaptation on various aspects of relationships (such as prior interactions, standard levels of 82 
cooperative behavior, and voluntary cooperative behaviors) and Quanji et al. (2016) 83 
investigated the relationships between contractual control, coordination, adaptation, and 84 
contractual partners’ voluntary and obligatory cooperation. The two studies showed the 85 
usefulness of joint-contract functions in investigating cooperative behaviors. These functions 86 
can also improve project performance in BIM. As there is more potential for EPC contracting 87 
parties to engage in opportunistic behaviors, joint-contract functions can play an important role 88 
in effective governance for projects involving BIM. Contractual control reduces opportunistic 89 
behaviors, and contractual coordination and contingency adaptability foster interorganizational 90 
trust between owners and contractors, all of which enhance cooperative behaviors between 91 
contracting parties and contribute to improved performance. 92 
Combining the three main contract functions also helps mitigate adverse effects from the 93 
individual contract functions, which also positively affects BIM-enabled project performance 94 
(Lee et al. 2018). For example, high levels of control breed low levels of trust (Faulkner 2000), 95 
whereas a contract environment that emphasizes coordination and contingency adaptability can 96 
build and strengthen trust, thus leading to better BIM performance (Lee et al. 2018). The 97 
authors of the current paper argue that interorganizational trust may influence the effect of 98 
joint-contract functions on project performance. In a previous study on the effects of contracts 99 
on trust, Jiang et al. (2016) showed that contracts influence relational trust positively, but they 100 
did not explore how contracts influence relational trust and contribute to project success. 101 
Moreover, distrust (which is often perceived in contractual contexts) can have a pernicious 102 
effect on exchange performance but may have a positive impact on project performance (Lee 103 
et al. 2018). Furthermore, a contractual relationship that favors fairness can reinforce trust, thus 104 
leading to more effective collaboration (Benítez-Ávila et al. 2018). Perceived fairness is 105 
another important variable that could mediate interorganizational trust and influence the 106 
relationship between joint-contract functions and BIM-enabled project performance. 107 
Against this background, this study aims to determine the direct effect of joint-contract 108 
functions on BIM-enabled EPC project performance, and it also explores the mediating effects 109 
of perceived fairness, interorganizational trust, and distrust. To test the research hypotheses, 110 
the study employs partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) based on 252 111 
questionnaire answers from industry practitioners involved in EPC oil and gas projects, and it 112 
quantifies the direct effect of joint-contract functions on BIM-enabled project performance as 113 
a complementary approach to EPC contracts. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first 114 
attempt to empirically investigate the effects of formal contracts on BIM-enabled project 115 
performance through the lens of joint-contract functions. Another area that has not been 116 
examined by previous studies is the potential mediating effects of calculative trust and distrust, 117 
relational trust, and perceived fairness between the contracting parties. By illuminating the 118 
effects of joint-contract functions on EPC BIM-enabled project performance (and by 119 
incorporating the mediating variables discussed above), this study provides more realistic 120 
guidelines for the construction of EPC contracts based on joint-contract functions, which 121 
promote effective collaboration in a BIM working environment.  122 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section discusses the 123 
theoretical background and presents hypotheses that describe the relationships between joint-124 
contract functions, perceived fairness, interorganizational trust, and project performance. The 125 
third section clarifies the research design, including the sampling, data collection procedures, 126 
data analysis methods, and the applied measures. The fourth section presents the analysis of 127 
the hypothesized model. The fifth section discusses the contributions and limitations of the 128 
approach, as well as possible directions for future research. The last section concludes the 129 
paper.  130 
 131 
Theoretical background and hypotheses development 132 
 Joint-contract functions and EPC BIM-enabled project performance 133 
As previously discussed, in the EPC approach, which emphasizes contracts and transaction 134 
law, formal contracts are wielded as instruments of control (Williston and Lewis 1920; Dyer 135 
1997). Furthermore, formal contracts that overly focus on control mechanisms can inhibit 136 
relationship development, thereby preventing the benefits of BIM from being fully realized 137 
(Huber et al. 2013). However, some degree of contractual control is necessary when using BIM 138 
to mitigate the risk of exploitation (Das and Teng 1996). Contractual control not only allows 139 
for behavioral control, such as through stipulating damages arising from breaching terms of 140 
BIM use, but it can also take the form of input and output controls throughs terms that stipulate 141 
BIM deliverables. Despite some of the detrimental effects of contractual control, Lumineau 142 
and Hendersen (2012) show that contractual coordination can actually strengthen the 143 
cooperative interaction between the contracting parties. Contingency adaptability provisions 144 
can hinder strategic flexibility (Malhotra and Lumineau 2011), but they can also enable the 145 
contracting parties to share knowledge while managing the changes associated with BIM 146 
(Reuer and Devarakonda 2016). 147 
There are numerous criteria for measuring successful project performance (Mir and 148 
Pinnington 2014). The most common include the satisfaction of team members, value added to 149 
the organization, the timeliness of projects, adherence to budgets and to the desired quality of 150 
work, and effectiveness of interactions between team members (Thompson et al. 2007). 151 
Contractual coordination and contingency adaptability reinforce collaboration among team 152 
members in a BIM work environment by facilitating the intensive sharing of knowledge and 153 
information (Zheng et al. 2017). As such, it is hypothesized that coordination and adaptability 154 
directly influence the effectiveness of the interactions between team members, thus increasing 155 
their work satisfaction. The harmonization between contractual control, coordination, and 156 
contingency adaptability may also enhance the quality of BIM deliverables and ensure optimal 157 
project performance. Parties that acknowledge the advantages of using functional contracting 158 
can more easily achieve better outcomes compared with those that focus less on functional 159 
contracting (Mellewigt et al. 2007). Hence, the following is hypothesized: 160 
H1: Joint-contract functions positively and directly relate to project performance. 161 
 162 
Mediation effect of interorganizational trust 163 
Trust is “a psychological state which comprises the intention to accept vulnerability based 164 
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 165 
395). Specifically, interorganizational trust is a firm’s expectation that another firm will not 166 
behave opportunistically (Bradach and Eccles 1989). Interorganizational trust thus allows two 167 
firms to exchange information and share responsibilities for decision-making (Zaheer et al. 168 
1998). Interorganizational trust includes calculative, relational, and institution-based trust 169 
(Rousseau et al. 1998). The aim of the current study is to determine how contract provisions 170 
represented by joint-contract functions impact the trust between firms. Thus, the study 171 
considers calculative and relational trust. Institutional trust, on the other hand, is affected by 172 
institutional practices and exchange routines and is not part of the current analysis (Zaheer et 173 
al. 1998). 174 
Calculative trust arises from the positive and negative consequences that are predicted by 175 
parties who are participating in a collaboration (Williamson 1993), and joint-contract functions 176 
can influence the calculative judgement of parties in their evaluation of risks and potential 177 
payoffs. For BIM, contract control may stipulate the damages to be paid, for example, in the 178 
event of copyright infringements claimed by a third party. Contractual coordination allocates 179 
the responsibilities of the parties in sharing, maintaining, and using the model, and it enables 180 
parties to assess the magnitude and quality of efforts they must make in these processes. On 181 
the other hand, contingency adaptability allows parties to make rational judgements about the 182 
risks they bear in case of technical errors during BIM development. These functions support 183 
calculative trust by allowing parties to consider the legal and economic consequences of 184 
breaching contracts (Lumineau 2017). 185 
Jiang et al. (2016) demonstrated that, compared to calculative trust, relational trust has a 186 
more significant effect on project performance. Relational trust is developed through 187 
reciprocity and social-emotional exchange, which require a higher level of confidence in the 188 
partner (Rousseau et al. 1998). Appropriate contractual control and contingency adaptability 189 
give parties more confidence when sharing information within a BIM working environment, 190 
since mutual interests are protected and uncertainties are reduced. Through promoting 191 
information sharing and collective decision-making in a BIM environment, coordination and 192 
contingency adaptability provisions foster relationships between parties. Several studies reveal 193 
that trust is closely connected to project performance. For instance, interorganizational trust 194 
has positive effects on cost performance improvement (Li et al. 2018). Furthermore, trust 195 
moderates the relationship between manager relational exchanges and project performance 196 
(Chen and Lin 2018). Trust also affects communication and, therefore, influences project 197 
performance (Cheung et al. 2013). Hence, the following are hypothesized: 198 
H2: Calculative trust has a positive influence on the relationship between joint-contract 199 
functions and project performance. 200 
H3: Relational trust has a positive influence on the relationship between joint-contract 201 
functions and project performance. 202 
 203 
Mediating effect of interorganizational distrust 204 
 Trust and distrust should be investigated separately since they are two distinct constructs 205 
(Dimoka 2010). In this study, distrust refers to the state of being influenced by calculative 206 
judgement. Contractual control allows for the easier identification of instances in which one or 207 
the other party deviates from the contract terms. Thus, it supports the enforcement of 208 
contractual terms (Lumineau 2017) and makes contracts more proficient in terms of the logical 209 
judgements that motivate assumptions about the other party. Contractual controls also promote 210 
calculative distrust. For example, calculative distrust can be associated with the following 211 
scenarios: the protection of the intellectual property rights of BIM model contributors, auditing 212 
a model to ensure the conformance of project deliverables, and stipulating damages arising 213 
from the third party copyright infringement, among others. The contractual controls promote 214 
calculative distrust—in other words, constructive skepticism and vigilance—safeguarding the 215 
interests of both parties involved in the contractual relationship (Lumineau 2017). The 216 
informed awareness that emerges from calculative distrust prompts the contracting parties to 217 
take appropriate measures to mitigate risks (Smyth et al. 2010). In other words, trust and 218 
distrust are simultaneously managed in this kind of antagonistic environment, in which parties 219 
are as likely to distrust as they are to trust one another (Lewicki et al. 1998). This implies that 220 
distrust may correlated with project performance, particularly if the parties experience 221 
increased trust after a successful collaboration and transaction. Trust can positively affect a 222 
transaction when fear and skepticism are minimized through appropriate distrust-related 223 
contract provisions (Lee et al. 2018). Hence, the following is hypothesized: 224 
H4: Calculative distrust has a positive influence on the relationship between joint-contract 225 
functions and project performance. 226 
 227 
Multiple mediating effects of perceived fairness and interorganizational trust 228 
When the fairness principle is applied to construction projects, both parties in a contract 229 
should hold equal positions for gaining economic advantage. When parties perceive there is 230 
fairness in the transaction, they will exhibit positive behaviors that can improve project 231 
performance, such as resolving problems collaboratively, working harmoniously, and engaging 232 
in mutual support, all of which are essential for success in BIM-enabled projects (Lim and 233 
Loosemoore 2017). Perceived fairness can reduce the potential for dissatisfaction and conflicts 234 
and bolster the legitimacy of organizational procedures. In construction research, perceived 235 
fairness has been shown to affect claims and disputes (Spittler and Jentzen 1992). In these 236 
ways, perceived fairness affects the cooperative behaviors of employees and the operational 237 
efficiency of firms (Greenberg 1989).  238 
There are two types of perceived fairness that influence decision-making: distributional and 239 
procedural fairness. To achieve distributional fairness, the material outcomes of a cooperative 240 
effort must be compatible with the perceived outcomes (Adams 1965). Procedural fairness not 241 
only pertains to material outcomes but also to the process used to reach those outcomes 242 
(Leventhal 1980). Contract functions can affect both types of fairness. Contractual coordination 243 
and contingency adaptability affects procedural fairness by specifying the ways in which 244 
parties involved in BIM collaborate, such as in the strategic coordination of BIM development 245 
in stages through mutual discussions and procedures to prevent conflicts from arising. 246 
Procedural fairness can induce a broad range of emotions in employees, including the feeling 247 
of being respected, feeling loyalty to and recognized by a company, feelings of trust, and work 248 
commitment (Collet 2008). Contractual control, which stipulates damages from a breach of 249 
terms in BIM delivery, affects distributional fairness, which in turn influences efficiency and 250 
productivity (Suliman 2007). It may be difficult, however, to realize absolute fairness (Lau and 251 
Rawlinson 2009). In light of the above discussion, the following are hypothesized:  252 
H5: Perceived fairness and calculative trust jointly and positively influence the relationship 253 
between joint-contract functions and project performance. 254 
H6: Perceived fairness and relational trust jointly and positively influence the relationship 255 
between joint-contract functions and project performance. 256 
 257 
Multiple mediating effects of perceived fairness and interorganizational distrust 258 
 Perceived fairness also impacts the positive outcomes of calculative distrust through joint 259 
contract provisions. For example, control provisions may include requirements for compliance 260 
audits and for the payment of damages for copyright infringement. These provisions invoke 261 
the distributional and procedural judgements of parties and motivate the careful monitoring of 262 
activities during BIM use (Provan and Skinner 1989), and the scrutinizing of actions that 263 
diverge from agreed-upon terms (Klein and Murphy 1988). Fairness plays an important role in 264 
mediating joint-contract functions, thus encouraging the positive outcomes of distrust. 265 
Specifically, fairness has to do with the way individuals are treated and the sense of justice that 266 
comes from the sharing of rewards (Lau and Rawlinson 2009). When perceived fairness 267 
influences distrust provisions, it may impact project performance. Therefore, the following is 268 
hypothesized: 269 
H7: Perceived fairness and calculative distrust jointly and positively influence the 270 
relationship between joint-contract functions and project performance. 271 
 272 
Research methodology 273 
Data collection 274 
To collect relevant data, the researchers approached approximately 1,200 construction-275 
related practitioners worldwide via LinkedIn, most of them from oil and gas conferences and 276 
workshops. It took two years to collect the contact details of all the practitioners who were 277 
involved in planning, construction, engineering, contract, and information management of EPC 278 
oil and gas projects. This kind of project was selected for two reasons. First, oil and gas projects 279 
have exploited BIM for over 20 years. Second, the maturity of the BIM used in oil and gas 280 
projects made it easier to conduct an investigation to identify the impact of contract functions 281 
on BIM-enabled project performance, and EPC is one of the most popular project delivery 282 
methods used in oil and gas projects.  283 
The survey, which consisted of four sections, was distributed to respondents, who answered 284 
questions based on their most recent projects. Section A of the survey inquired about the project 285 
and personal details. To help respondents understand and respond to the survey, BIM was 286 
referred to as three-dimensional (3D); four-dimensional (4D, Construction Sequencing); five-287 
dimensional (5D, Cost Estimation); and six-dimensional (6D, Asset Lifecycle Management) 288 
modeling and its associated technologies; and/or digital data involved in the design, production, 289 
and maintenance process. Oil and gas projects were referred to as projects related to building 290 
facilities for oil, gas, and their derivatives (e.g., methanol, fertilizers). This included drilling 291 
and production platforms; floating production storage and offloading systems (FPSO); floating 292 
liquefied natural gas (FLNG); onshore oil and gas plants; and other related infrastructure (e.g., 293 
pipeline, jetty, and ship loading facilities). Sections B, C, and D comprised questions on the 294 
measurement items for the contract functions related to BIM, interorganizational trust and 295 
distrust, and project performance, respectively. Each variable consisted of four measurement 296 
items except for project performance, which consisted of seven measurement items. A two-297 
round pilot survey was conducted to validate and revise the draft questionnaire as required 298 
(Jiang et al. 2016). In the first round, the questionnaire was distributed to three experts in oil 299 
and gas contracts and engineering and project management, respectively. After revising the 300 
questionnaire, it was sent to nine oil and gas project practitioners for further comments. The 301 
questionnaire was then revised until it was suitable for online distribution, which took place 302 
from May to July of 2018. The time frame given for responding to the survey was two weeks. 303 
A follow-up reminder was sent five days before the response expiry date. In total, 276 304 
responses were collected, with 2.6% of surveys having some missing values. Following the 305 
assertion by Schafer (1999) that a missing rate of 5% or less is inconsequential, the 306 
observations with missing data were removed from the dataset. After elimination, the sample 307 
comprised 252 responses. Although the PLS-SEM algorithm has a bootstrapping feature to 308 
deal with skewed data, Hair et al. (2014) suggested that the skewness and kurtosis of the data 309 
should be + or -1. The data used for analysis in PLS-SEM that had a skewness exceeding 1 310 
were transformed to ensure they fell within the limits of +1 or -1.  311 
 312 
Data analysis method 313 
PLS-SEM was used to determine the influence of joint-contract functions on project 314 
performance and gauge any mediating effects on the relationship. This method was selected 315 
for its precision in prediction-oriented analysis compared with covariance-based SEM (CB-316 
SEM) as well as for its ability to deal with complex models (Rigdon et al. 2017). Moreover, 317 
the bootstrapping feature available in the PLS-SEM algorithm allowed for a more robust study 318 
of skewed data and formative measures, as it transformed the data under the central limit 319 
theorem (Ringle et al. 2009). 320 
 321 
Sample data 322 
 Referring to Appendix 1, the respondents who worked with project owners represented 44% 323 
of the sample and the EPC contractors, 56%. Most of the involved firms have operated for over 324 
50 years, and their projects were mostly onshore plants and other associated facilities and in 325 
Asia, North America, and Oceania. The contract values for most projects were above USD 500 326 
million with durations of 2–5 years. Additionally, most respondents had more than 20 years of 327 
working experience in the construction industry, as project managers (37%), contract managers 328 
(13%), engineering managers (13%), construction managers (12%), information managers 329 
(7%), project control managers (6%), and in other related roles (13%). Oil and gas projects 330 
were found to fall significantly under the three-dimensional shared information model (40%), 331 
with 32% of respondents stating that the shared information model used in the projects included 332 
digital fabrication. Although 46% of respondents stated that the projects did not include other 333 
BIM uses, 30%, 16%, and 8% of respondents mentioned the projects applied a four-334 
dimensional model for construction sequencing, a five-dimensional model for cost estimation, 335 
and a six-dimensional model for asset lifecycle management, respectively.  336 
 To assess sampling error, the potential non-response bias was evaluated. Lindner et al. 337 
(2001) suggested investigating this type of bias through an independent t-test to compare the 338 
significant differences between early and late responses. As there is no consistent definition for 339 
“late respondents,” they were stipulated as those who answered the survey after receiving the 340 
reminder email. The outcomes indicated no non-response bias, since the difference between 341 
early and late responses was not significant. After cleaning the data, the authors examined 342 
missing values using Little’s missing completely at random test. The outcomes of the test 343 
showed that the Chi-square was 48.405 with DF = 40 and Sig. = 0.170, which was not 344 
significant. This suggested that missing values were random. The number of missing values 345 
was 2.6%, where a 5% or lower missing rate was considered insignificant (Schafer 1999). 346 
Hence, the observations with missing data were removed from the dataset.  347 
 348 
Measures 349 
The measurement items for contract functions were obtained from prior studies and BIM 350 
contract protocols. The respondents were given an opportunity to clarify any doubts before 351 
responding to the questions. Some items for contract functions may have looked similar but 352 
had different meanings. For instance, contractual control was measured by the specified 353 
contract terms that defined a right to audit for conformance in delivering BIM (CON_1) and 354 
stipulated damages against the party that failed to comply with the terms related to BIM 355 
deliverables (CON_2). Contractual control was also measured by general controlling and 356 
monitoring of BIM deliverables terms (CON_3), such as the requirements of contracting parties 357 
to deliver BIM as specified in the contracts, and the terms that specified solutions for non-358 
conformance of BIM deliverables (CON_4). For COR_4, contractual coordination provided 359 
dispute resolution provisions for parties to achieve collective action to deal with the conflicts 360 
arising from delivering BIM, which is different from contractual control.  361 
The measurement scales for project performance, perceived fairness, calculative trust, and 362 
relational trust in Table 1 draw from measurement scales validated in prior studies. Calculative 363 
distrust was measured following the literature (Lumineau 2017). All construct indicators were 364 
measured using 5-point Likert scales, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree or from 365 
extremely low to extremely high. Reflective constructs formed the indicators. All constructs 366 
were reflective, except for the joint-contract function, which was formative. Thus, the three 367 
contract functions—contractual control, coordination, and contingency adaptability—368 
influenced the joint-contract functions. Although joint-contract functions were interpreted as 369 
formative constructs, they repeated the indicators in the three contract functions. Since joint-370 
contract functions had a reflective measurement model, as in Figure 1, all relevant reliability 371 
and validity tests had to be cleared when measuring the reflective model, with the exception of 372 
the discriminant validity between the three distinct and joint-contract functions (Hair et al. 373 
2014). 374 
 375 
Results and data analysis 376 
SmartPLS 3.0 was used to analyze the measurement models and the structural model. The 377 
assessment followed Hair et al. (2014). 378 
 379 
Evaluation of measurement models 380 
 The indicators in a reflective construct must be consistent with each other within the 381 
construct. To measure internal consistency reliability, the suggested Cronbach's alpha’s value 382 
should range from 0.70 to 0.90 (DeVellis 2016) to demonstrate the intercorrelations of a set of 383 
items. Table 2 shows that all Cronbach’s alpha values are below 0.90, except for joint-contract 384 
functions, which had a value of 0.927. However, it is less accurate to assess internal consistency 385 
reliability using this measure, as it is responsive to the number of items measured on a scale 386 
(Hair et al. 2014). Composite reliability (CR) is a more reliable internal consistency measure. 387 
It considers the different outer loadings of indicators, measurement errors of the indicators, and 388 
their variances. Table 1 shows that all constructs had CR values below the 0.95 threshold (Hair 389 
et al. 2014). All outer loadings of indicators were above the 0.70 threshold, except for the 390 
contractual control that stipulated damages against the party failing to deliver the digital model 391 
and/or data, with the value of 0.609 in the joint-contract functions construct. This control was 392 
removed from the model. The values of the outer loadings of contractual control defined the 393 
right to audit for conformance in delivering the digital model and/or data in the joint-contract 394 
functions construct; the distrust construct, in which one party was constructively skeptical 395 
about the other party, enabled better work in the project; project performance constructs, which 396 
indicated the outcome of the project, added value to the organization’s operations; and the 397 
project satisfying health and safety performance expectations were also below the threshold, at 398 
0.672, 0.673, 0.686, and 0.649 respectively. Nevertheless, indicators with outer loading values 399 
ranging from 0.40 to 0.70 should be removed if removal increases the value of CR or the 400 
average variance extracted (AVE) (Hair et al. 2014). The deletion of these indicators reduced 401 
the CR value; hence, they were retained in the model. Simultaneously, AVE was used to assess 402 
the extent to which an indicator correlated positively with other indicators of the same construct 403 
(Hair et al. 2014). The values of the AVEs of all constructs were above the 0.50 threshold, 404 
demonstrating that the indicators in the constructs converged. 405 
 Discriminant validity is another important measure that analyzes the differences between 406 
constructs. This measure shows a construct is distinguished from other constructs in a model 407 
and captures a different phenomenon. In PLS-SEM, the heterotrait-monotrait ratio (HTMT) of 408 
correlations is a new measure that assesses discriminant validity, as the Fornell–Larcker 409 
criterion and cross-loadings do not detect discriminant validity reliably in some situations 410 
(Henseler et al. 2015). Table 3 shows the HTMT value between contractual coordination and 411 
contingency adaptability is 0.950. Henseler et al. (2015) suggested that indicators with low 412 
correlations should be removed to reduce HTMT values. Hence, the lowest outer loading values 413 
for contractual coordination (which delegates the roles of parties for delivering BIM and 414 
provides dispute resolution provisions to deal with any conflicts) were removed (Table 2), 415 
which reduced the HTMT value to 0.885. 416 
 417 
Common method variance 418 
 The evaluation of common method variance is important since it influences the validity and 419 
reliability of measurement models (Podsakoff et al. 2003). This type of systematic error occurs 420 
when a single source of research design is used (Schaller et al. 2015). This study may be 421 
affected by common method variance, as the data were collected through a single source, that 422 
is, an online survey. Harman's (1976) single-factor test is a common method used to assess 423 
variance. The result of the analysis showed a variance of 24.13%, meaning that it was unlikely 424 
the common method variance affected the study outcomes (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). The 425 
full collinearity test is a reliable method proposed by Kock (2015) to determine common 426 
method variance in PLS-SEM research. The accepted criterion for variance inflation factor 427 
(VIF) values is that it should not be above 3.3 when using the PLS-SEM algorithm (Kock 428 
2015). The test in this study showed that all VIF values of the constructs were below 3.3, 429 
indicating no common method variance.  430 
 431 
Structural model evaluation 432 
 To examine the structural model, Stone-Geisser’s Q2 value was calculated to evaluate the 433 
predictive relevance of indicators. All constructs had positive Q2 values (calculative trust = 434 
0.081; calculative distrust = 0.041; relational trust = 0.137; perceived fairness = 0.055; joint-435 
contract functions = 0.569; and project performance = 0.11), indicating the predictive relevance 436 
of the path model for the constructs. Next, the coefficient of determination (R2 value) was used 437 
to assess the predictive accuracy of the model. R2 values range from zero to one. The higher 438 
the R2 value, the higher the predictive accuracy. In research related to predicting the drivers of 439 
success, an R2 value of 0.20 is considered high (Hair et al. 2014). In this study, project 440 
performance had the highest R2 value (0.233), followed by relational trust (0.225), calculative 441 
trust (0.150), calculative distrust (0.098), and perceived fairness (0.092). In addition to the 442 
evaluation of R2 values, the effect size f2 was used to evaluate the substantive impact of a 443 
variable when removed from the model.  444 
 The small, medium, and large effect sizes were represented by the f2 values of 0.02, 0.15, 445 
and 0.35 respectively (Cohen 1988). Table 4 shows that all exogenous variables had at least 446 
small effects on the endogenous variables, except for calculative distrust on project 447 
performance and joint-contract functions on calculative trust and project performance, with f2 448 
values of 0.000, 0.010, and 0.009, respectively. Comparing the f2 values of the variables shows 449 
that relational trust and perceived fairness were the endogenous variables in the model. 450 
Relational trust was affected by both perceived fairness (medium effect, f2=0.165) and joint-451 
contract functions (small effect, f2=0.046), whereas perceived fairness was solely affected by 452 
joint-contract functions (small effect, f2=0.102). Calculative trust was partially endogenous, as 453 
it was affected by perceived fairness (small effect, f2=0.127) but not joint-contract functions.  454 
 The constructs’ path coefficients were then analyzed. Bootstrapping was conducted for 455 
5,000 iterations to identify the t-values, p-values, and confidence intervals of the paths 456 
(Palanski et al. 2011). Table 5 shows that, although the direct effect between joint-contract 457 
functions and project performance is 0.09 and the p-value is not significant, the joint-contract 458 
functions had a significant total effect (β = 0.227, p < 0.01) and indirect effect (β = 0.136, p < 459 
0.01) on project performance. Hence, H1 is partially supported. Table 4 also shows that there 460 
was no significant effect of calculative trust on joint-contract functions and project 461 
performance (β = 0.230, p > 0.10); therefore, H2 is not supported. In contrast to calculative 462 
trust, relational trust was a significant mediator variable between joint-contract functions and 463 
project performance (β = 0.058, p < 0.01), showing that H3 is supported. The results in Table 464 
5 also show that calculative distrust insignificantly influenced the relationship between joint-465 
contract functions and project performance (β = 0.001, p > 0.10). Hence, H4 is not supported. 466 
In terms of multiple mediation effects, H5 is supported. Perceived fairness and calculative 467 
trust jointly influenced joint-contract functions and project performance (β = 0.023, p < 0.10). 468 
H6 is also supported, since perceived fairness and relational trust jointly influenced joint-469 
contract functions and project performance (β = 0.031, p < 0.05). However, H7 is not 470 
supported, as perceived fairness and calculative trust did not jointly mediate contract functions 471 
and project performance (β = 0.000, p > 0.10). Figure 2 shows the final model for joint-contract 472 
functions and project performance.  473 
 474 
Moderating effects analysis 475 
To determine whether the relationships in the structural model were influenced by different 476 
project scopes and types, a moderating effects analysis was conducted with the finding that 477 
relationships between constructs in the model were not influenced by scopes (e.g., FPSO, 478 
FLNG, and other plants) and types of projects (locations, values, and durations) with the 479 
exception of the paths in Table 6.  480 
 Table 6 and Figure 3 show that the positive relationship between joint-contract functions 481 
and relational trust was stronger for projects located onshore but the relationship turns negative 482 
for the projects located offshore. The relationship between joint-contract functions and 483 
calculative distrust was positive for both low and high contract values. This relationship was 484 
stronger for projects with higher value. Project duration moderated the relationship between 485 
calculative distrust and project performance such that for shorter project durations, the effect 486 
was negative, and for longer project durations, it was positive. By contrast, the relationship 487 
between joint-contract functions and project performance was stronger for projects with a 488 
longer duration but weaker when the project duration was shorter. 489 
 490 
Discussion and contributions 491 
Joint-contract functions and the mediating effect of relational trust 492 
The results above provide new insights, including the observation that joint-contract 493 
functions indirectly influence BIM-enabled EPC project performance through perceived 494 
fairness and relational trust; this is despite the fact that the effects of joint-contract functions 495 
on relational trust are not so pronounced in offshore projects. The results are different from 496 
prior research in that formal contracts tend to restrain the establishment of relational norms 497 
between contracting parties (Malhotra and Murnighan 2002). The outcomes of this study 498 
explain how joint-contract functions can be used as a complementary approach to EPC BIM-499 
enabled projects, an area hitherto not empirically examined. The moderation analysis shows 500 
that, when the EPC project duration is longer, the relationship between joint-contract functions 501 
and a BIM-enabled project performance is stronger. These outcomes suggest that the 502 
conventional approach of EPC contracts that focused on imposing contractual obligations to 503 
safeguard transactions is no longer an effective governance method for long-term BIM-enabled 504 
projects. In a BIM working environment, enhancing contractual coordination and contingency 505 
adaptability, in addition to formal control, has implications on relational development and, 506 
thereby, leads to EPC project success. These functions include providing operational 507 
coordination for parties to discuss the necessary adjustments that need to be made to the BIM 508 
model upon the completion of the model review, redefining the specific objectives of the BIM 509 
model through mutual discussions upon the completion of the first-stage model development, 510 
and achieving collective action for handling unforeseen circumstances that may involve BIM. 511 
For EPC project success, construction contracting parties should view formal contracts as a 512 
mechanism to achieve a shared purpose instead of a tool that solely protects their benefits and 513 
interests. Focusing on contractual coordination in BIM model development and on contingency 514 
adaptability for joint problem solving enables parties to implement BIM with dynamic 515 
efficiency and embed relational elements into the BIM working environment.  516 
 517 
Perceived fairness as a cornerstone of joint-contract functions  518 
Although Lumineau (2017) proposed that excessive contract functions may have negative 519 
effects on calculative and non-calculative trust, there is no study on how the extent of contract 520 
functions influences trust. This study shows that perceived fairness influenced the degree of 521 
calculative and relational trust and impacted EPC project performance positively and 522 
significantly. This suggests that an adequate level of joint-contract functions could be 523 
determined through the perceived fairness of both parties. This outcome broadens the views of 524 
EPC practitioners and suggests looking beyond the traditional EPC contract setting. Contracts 525 
that promote joint problem solving and fair risk allocation would clearly provide a team-526 
building platform and help cultivate rapport between contracting parties (Cheung et al. 2009). 527 
Hence, EPC contracts should not be framed solely to benefit the client. Contracting parties 528 
should consider the fairness of terms when devising BIM-related contract provisions to 529 
maximize the potential for project success. For instance, EPC contractors should not be held 530 
responsible for the failure to deliver BIM, which may be outside their control, and appropriate 531 
time extensions should be granted so that contractors can rectify these errors or issues.  532 
 533 
Distrust does not necessarily negatively impact project performance 534 
 This study also reveals a new perspective on distrust in terms of BIM-enabled EPC project 535 
performance. It is commonly believed that formal contracts increase partner distrust and in 536 
turn, induce non-cooperative behaviors (Wu et al. 2017). While joint-contract functions have a 537 
significant effect on calculative distrust (which does not warrant its significant effect on EPC 538 
project performance) the results demonstrate that they may not necessarily have negative 539 
implications for EPC project performance. The relationship between joint-contract functions 540 
and project performance is stronger when project duration is longer and contract value is 541 
higher. This substantiates the fact that calculative distrust in EPC projects is necessary to 542 
prevent knowledge leaks, support vigilance, and promote healthy suspicion and constructive 543 
skepticism against the other party’s opportunistic behaviors, all of which can boost confidence 544 
and help both parties to perform better in BIM-enabled projects. Examples of functions that 545 
can have these effects include defining the right to audit for conformance in delivering BIM, 546 
controlling and monitoring BIM deliverables, and providing resolutions for non-compliance 547 
with the terms and conditions of delivering BIM. 548 
 549 
Effective collaboration among project participants without altering existing EPC contract 550 
structure 551 
 Finally, the mediation effects of interorganizational trust between joint-contract functions 552 
and BIM-enabled EPC project performance demonstrate not only that owners and EPC 553 
contractors should collaborate more intensively to build trust but also that other project 554 
stakeholders with direct contractual relationships (such as specialist contractors and 555 
subcontractors) should be involved directly in the collaboration process. For example, as per 556 
Figure 4, the EPC project network is egocentric. Only the EPC main contractor plays a 557 
prominent role in communicating between owners and other project participants. The owner 558 
and other project participants are peripheral nodes in the project networks, and they depend on 559 
the main contractor to deliver and receive information. This practice is fragmented, as each of 560 
the project participants follows their own procedures (Fakhimi et al. 2017), and it increases 561 
asymmetric information and opportunistic behaviors (You et al. 2018). In fact, all project 562 
stakeholders are required to share and receive project information through a unified 563 
information model. There is very little trust involved at the beginning of projects, but social 564 
exchange relationships emerge as each party proves its trustworthiness. During the information 565 
sharing process, as the parties engage more deeply in EPC projects (Shapiro 1987), relational 566 
norms are established. As such, stakeholders in BIM contracts within EPC projects should 567 
strive to harmonize relationships with other stakeholders in both their formal and informal 568 
social networks. Ultimately, this will foster an effective and collaborative BIM work 569 
environment. 570 
 571 
Limitations and future research directions 572 
 The current study has certain limitations. The PLS-SEM method used here is exploratory 573 
and different from CB-SEM. The CB-SEM approach uses strict measures of confirmatory 574 
factor analysis to validate a developed theory, while this study uses PLS-SEM for exploration 575 
and prediction. Additionally, the use of contract functions may be affected by the levels of BIM 576 
use in a project. As such, the results of this study may be influenced by BIM use levels, since 577 
BIM uses may vary by project.  578 
 There are several antecedents of joint-contract functions—such as BIM asset specificity, 579 
behavioral uncertainty, and environmental uncertainty—which require attention, as the extent 580 
of joint-contract functions that influence interorganizational trust may be affected by BIM 581 
transaction attributes. Further, interorganizational trust predecessors, such as communication 582 
and reciprocity, may strengthen the relationship between joint-contract functions and 583 
interorganizational trust. If the influences of these predecessors are empirically proven, then 584 
when devising BIM-related provisions, appropriate strategies should be considered to enhance 585 
these factors to optimize the influence of joint-contract functions on BIM-enabled project 586 
performance.  587 
 Since the model is an aggregate of three different contract functions (joint-contract 588 
functions) in a BIM-enabled EPC project setting, the effect of the individual functions on EPC 589 
project performance was not identified. For instance, the contract that specified the right to 590 
audit for compliance while delivering BIM may impact perceived fairness (procedural fairness) 591 
positively for one party but may induce distrust for the other party. How this contract function 592 
translates into project performance is not clear. Future research on the model should investigate 593 
the perspectives of both contracting parties and identify ways to achieve optimal trust between 594 
parties during the development of BIM-related contracts. Additionally, industry norms and 595 
standard contract provisions, which may have implications for the model beyond the scope of 596 
this research, also require further investigation.  597 
 Although the study has successfully shown the mediating effects of interorganizational trust 598 
and distrust in the relationship between joint-contract functions and BIM-enabled EPC project 599 
performance, future studies should determine how contract functions influence trust among 600 
project stakeholders through a comprehensive social network analysis. Through investigating 601 
formal and informal collaborative relationships using social network analysis, researchers 602 
could assess the dynamic evolution of interorganizational trust among project participants 603 
during BIM-enabled project implementation (Lee et al. 2017). 604 
 605 
Conclusions 606 
This study has determined the direct and mediating effects of joint-contract functions and 607 
BIM-enabled EPC project performance through PLS-SEM. The research outcomes have 608 
demonstrated that relational trust has a positive influence on the relationship between joint-609 
contract functions and EPC project performance. It also showed that, while calculative trust 610 
may not significantly mediate the relationship between joint-contract functions and EPC 611 
project performance, its impacts are more pronounced in terms of perceived fairness. This 612 
suggests that joint-contract functions may influence interorganizational trust for BIM-enabled 613 
EPC project performance improvement when fairness is perceived. Moreover, the study 614 
demonstrated that the calculative distrust influenced by the joint-contract functions may not 615 
necessarily have negative implications for project performance. In other words, calculative 616 
distrust arising from joint-contract functions may not be detrimental to EPC project 617 
performance and is an important element in BIM-enabled projects. The examinations of the 618 
effects of joint-contract functions on BIM-enabled EPC project performance and their 619 
mediating effects have provided valuable insights for relevant industries, showing mainly that 620 
BIM can be implemented effectively within a traditional EPC contract setting.  The current 621 
findings contribute to knowledge development of appropriate contract framing for BIM-622 
enabled EPC project stakeholders, an area not discovered in the previous literature. However, 623 
for this complementary approach to be used effectively in EPC projects, certain changes should 624 
be made to contracts to influence interorganizational trust, distrust, and perceived fairness 625 
between owners and EPC contractors. This approach will maximize the potential for EPC 626 
project success. 627 
 628 
Data Availability Statement 629 
All data generated or analyzed during the study are included in the submitted article and 630 
supplemental data file. 631 
 632 
Acknowledgements  633 
This work was supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage Project 634 
[LP140100873] and Discovery Project [DP170104612]; and the National Natural Science 635 
Foundation of China [71571098]. 636 
 637 
References 638 
Adams, J.S. (1965). “Inequity in social exchange” in Berkowitz, L. (ed.) Advances in 639 
Experimental Social Psychology. Vol. 2, Academic Press, New York. 640 
Benaroch, M., Lichtenstein, Y., and Fink, L. (2015). “Contract Design Choices and the Balance 641 
of Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Transaction Costs in Software Development Outsourcing.” MIS 642 
Quarterly. 40(1):57-82. 643 
Benítez-Ávila, C., Hartmann, A., Dewulf, G. and Henseler, J. (2018). “Interplay of relational 644 
and contractual governance in public-private partnerships: The mediating role of relational 645 
norms, trust and partners' contribution.” Int. J. Proj. Manag. 36(3), 429-443. 646 
Berends, K. (2007). “Engineering and construction projects for oil and gas processing facilities: 647 
Contracting, uncertainty and the economics of information.”  Energy Policy, 35(8), pp.4260-648 
4270. 649 
Bradach, J., and R. Eccles (1989). “Price, authority, and trust: From ideal types to plural 650 
forms.” Ann. Rev. Sociol. 15 (1), 97–118.  651 
Chen, H.L. and Lin, Y.L. (2018). “Goal orientations, leader-leader exchange, trust, and the 652 
outcomes of project performance.”  Int. J. Proj. Manag. 36(5), 716-729. 653 
Cheung, S.O., Yiu, T.W. and Chiu, O.K. (2009). “The aggressive–cooperative drivers of 654 
construction contracting.” Int. J. Proj. Manage. 27(7), 727-735. 655 
Cheung, S. O., Wong, W. K., Yiu, T. W., and Pang, H.Y. (2013). “Interweaving trust and 656 
communication for project performance.” J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 139 (8): 914–950. 657 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. 2nd Ed.  Lawrence 658 
Erlbaum Associates, USA. 659 
Collet, B.A. (2008). “Confronting the insider-outsider polemic in conducting research with 660 
diasporic communities: Towards a community-based approach.” Refuge. 25(1), 77. 661 
Das, T.K. and Teng, B.S. (1996). “Risk types and inter‐firm alliance structures.” J Manag. 662 
Studies. 33(6): 827-843. 663 
DeVellis, R.F. (2016). Scale development: Theory and applications (4th Ed.). Sage 664 
publications. 665 
Dimoka, A. (2010). “What does the brain tell us about trust and distrust? Evidence from a 666 
functional neuroimaging study.”  Mis Q. 34 (2), 373–396. 667 
Dyer, J. H. (1997). “Effective interfirm collaboration: How firms minimize transaction costs 668 
and maximize transaction value.” Strategic Manage. J. 18 (7): 535–556. 669 
Eckhard, B., and Mellewigt, T. (2006). “Contractual functions and contractual dynamics in 670 
inter-firm relationships: What we know and how to proceed.” New York: SSRN. 671 
Fakhimi, A., Majrouhi Sardrood, J., Mazroi, A., Ghoreishi, S.R. and Azhar, S. (2017). 672 
“Influences of building information modeling (BIM) on oil, gas, and petrochemical firms.” 673 
Sci. Tech. Built Env. 23(6), 1063-1077. 674 
Faulkner, D. (2000). Trust and Control: Opposing or Complementary Functions?” Cooperative 675 
strategy: Economic, business and organizational issues. Edited by D. Faulkner and M. De 676 
Rond. New York: Oxford University Press. 677 
Ghoshal, S., and Moran, P. (1996). “Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory.” 678 
Acad. Manage. Rev., 21(1), 13–47. 679 
Greenberg, J. (1989). “Reactions to procedural injustice in payment distributions: do the ends 680 
justify the means.” J. Applied Psychology. 72, 55–61. 681 
Hair Jr, J.F., Hult, G.T.M., Ringle, C. and Sarstedt, M. (2014). A primer on partial least squares 682 
structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). Sage Publications, USA. 683 
Harman, H.H. (1976). Modern Factor Analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 684 
Henseler, J., Ringle, C.M. and Sarstedt, M. (2015). “A new criterion for assessing discriminant 685 
validity in variance-based structural equation modeling.” J. Acad. Mktg. Sci. 43(1), 115-686 
135. 687 
Huber, T.L., Fischer, T.A., Dibbern, J., Hirschheim, R. (2013). “A process model of 688 
complementarity and substitution of contractual and relational governance in IS 689 
outsourcing.” J. Manag. Info. Systems. 30, 81–114. 690 
Jiang, W., Lu, Y. and Le, Y. (2016). “Trust and project success: A twofold perspective between 691 
owners and contractors.” J. Manag. Eng. 32(6), 04016022. 692 
Klein, B. and Murphy, K.M. (1988). “Vertical restraints as contract enforcement mechanisms.”  693 
J. Law Econ. 31(2), 265-297. 694 
Kock, N. (2015). “Common method bias in PLS-SEM: A full collinearity assessment 695 
approach.” Int. J. e-Collaboration. 11(4), 1-10. 696 
Lau, E. and Rowlinson, S. (2009). “Interpersonal trust and inter-firm trust in construction 697 
projects.” Constr. Manag. Econ. 27(6), 539-554. 698 
Lee, C.Y., Chong, H.Y., Liao, P.C. and Wang X. (2017). “Critical review of social network 699 
analysis applications in complex project management.” J. Manag. Eng., 34(2), 04017061. 700 
Lee, C.Y., Chong, H.Y. and Wang, X. (2018). “Enhancing BIM Performance in EPC Projects 701 
through Integrative Trust-Based Functional Contracting Model.” J. Constr. Eng. Manag. 702 
144(7), 06018002. 703 
Leventhal, G.S. (1980). “What should be done with equity theory? New approaches to the study 704 
of fairness in social relationships” in Gergen, K., Greenberg, M. and Willis, R. (eds) Social 705 
exchange, Plenum, New York, 27–55. 706 
Lewicki, R.J., McAllister, D.J. and Bies, R.J. (1998). “Trust and distrust: New relationships 707 
and realities.” Acad. Manag. Rev. 23(3), 438-458. 708 
Li, X., Shen, G.Q., Wu, P. and Yue, T. (2019). “Integrating building information modeling and 709 
prefabrication housing production.” Auto. Constr., 100, 46-60. 710 
Li, Q., Yin, Z., Chong, H.Y. and Shi, Q. (2018). “Nexus of Interorganizational Trust, Principled 711 
Negotiation, and Joint Action for Improved Cost Performance: Survey of Chinese 712 
Megaprojects.” J. Manag. Eng. 34(6), p.04018036. 713 
Lim, B.T. and Loosemore, M. (2017). “The effect of inter-organizational justice perceptions 714 
on organizational citizenship behaviors in construction projects.” Int. J. Proj. Manag. 715 
35(2),.95-106. 716 
Lindner, J.R., Murphy, T.H. and Briers, G.E. (2001). “Handling nonresponse in social science 717 
research.” J. Agricultural Edu. 42(4),.43-53. 718 
Liu, Y., Van Nederveen, S. and Hertogh, M. (2017). “Understanding effects of BIM on 719 
collaborative design and construction: An empirical study in China.” Int. J. Proj. Manag. 720 
35(4), 686-698. 721 
Lu, W., Zhang, L. and Zhang, L. (2016). “Effect of contract completeness on contractors’ 722 
opportunistic behavior and the moderating role of interdependence.” J. Constr. Eng. & 723 
Manag., 142(6), p.04016004. 724 
Luo, Y. (2002). “Contract, cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures.” 725 
Strategic Manag. J. 23 (10), 903–920. 726 
Lumineau, F. and Henderson, J.E. (2012). “The influence of relational experience and 727 
contractual governance on the negotiation strategy in buyer–supplier disputes.” J. 728 
Operations Manag. 30(5), 382-395. 729 
Lumineau, F. (2017). “How contracts influence trust and distrust.” J. Manag.43(5), 1553-1577. 730 
Malhotra, D. and Lumineau, F. (2011). “Trust and collaboration in the aftermath of conflict: 731 
The effects of contract structure.” Acad. Manag. J. 54(5), pp.981-998. 732 
Malhotra, D., and Murnighan, J.K. (2002). “The effects of contracts on interpersonal trust.” 733 
Admin. Sci. Qtly. 47(3), 534-559. 734 
Mayer, K.J. (2007). “How contracts and relationships evolve over time: a case study of 735 
software contracting.” Working paper, University of Southern California. 736 
Mir, F.A. and Pinnington, A.H. (2014). “Exploring the value of project management: linking 737 
project management performance and project success.” Int. J. Proj. Manag., 32(2), pp.202-738 
217. 739 
Mellewigt, T., Madhok, A., & Weibel, A. (2007). “Trust and formal contracts in 740 
interorganizational relationships—substitutes and complements.” Manag. Dec. Econ. 28(8), 741 
833-847. 742 
Mir, F.A. and Pinnington, A.H. (2014). “Exploring the value of project management: linking 743 
project management performance and project success.” Int. J. Proj. Manag. 32(2), 202-217. 744 
Palanski, M.E., Kahai, S.S. and Yammarino, F.J. (2011). “Team virtues and performance: An 745 
examination of transparency, behavioral integrity, and trust.” J. Bus. Ethics, 99(2), 201-216. 746 
Podsakoff, N.P. (2003). “Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of 747 
the literature and recommended remedies.” J. Applied Psychology. 88(5), 879-903. 748 
Podsakoff, P.M. and Organ, D.W. (1986). “Self-reports in organizational research: Problems 749 
and prospects.” J. Manag. 12(4), 531-544. 750 
Poppo, L., Zhou, K.Z. and Li, J.J., (2016). “When can you trust “trust”? Calculative trust, 751 
relational trust, and supplier performance.” Strat. Manage. J., 37(4), pp.724-741. 752 
Provan, K.G. and Skinner, S.J. (1989). “Interorganizational dependence and control as 753 
predictors of opportunism in dealer-supplier relations.” Acad. Manag. J. 32(1), 202-212. 754 
Quanji, Z., Zhang, S., & Wang, Y. (2016). “Contractual Governance Effects on Cooperation 755 
in Construction Projects: Multifunctional Approach.” J. Prof. Issues Eng. Edu. Practice. 756 
143(3): 04016025-1-12. 757 
Reuer, J.J. and Devarakonda, S.V. (2016). “Mechanisms of hybrid governance: Administrative 758 
committees in non-equity alliances.” Acad. Manag. J. 59(2), 510-533. 759 
Rigdon, E.E., Sarstedt, M. and Ringle, C.M. (2017). “On comparing results from CB-SEM and 760 
PLS-SEM: Five perspectives and five recommendations.” Marketing ZFP, 39(3), 4-16. 761 
Ringle, C.M., Götz, O., Wetzels, M., Wilson, B. (2009). “On the Use of Formative 762 
Measurement Specifications in Structural Equation Modeling: A Monte Carlo Simulation 763 
Study to Compare Covariance-Based and Partial Least Squares Model Estimation 764 
Methodologies.” METEOR Research Memoranda (RM/09/014). Maastricht University. 765 
Rousseau, D. M., S. B. Sitkin, R. S. Burt, and C. Camerer. (1998). “Not so different after all: 766 
A cross-discipline view of trust.” Acad. Manage. Rev. 23 (3), 393–404.  767 
Schafer, J.L. (1999). “Multiple imputation: a primer.” Statistical methods in medical research, 768 
8(1), pp.3-15. 769 
Schaller, T.K., Patil, A. and Malhotra, N.K. (2015). “Alternative techniques for assessing 770 
common method variance: an analysis of the theory of planned behavior research.” Org.  771 
Res. Methods. 18(2), 177-206. 772 
Schepker, D.J., Oh, W.Y., Martynov, A., & Poppo, L. (2014). “The many futures of contracts: 773 
Moving beyond structure and safeguarding to coordination and adaptation.” J. Manage., 774 
40(1): 193-225. 775 
Shapiro, Susan P. (1987). “The social control of impersonal trust.” American J. Sociology. 776 
93/3: 623–658. 777 
Smyth, H., Gustafsson, M. and Ganskau, E. (2010). “The value of trust in project business.” 778 
Int. J. Proj. Manag. 28(2), 117-129. 779 
Spittler, J.R. and Jentzen, G.H. (1992). “Dispute resolution: managing construction conflict 780 
with step negotiations.” AACE Transactions, D9, 1–10. 781 
Suliman, A.M.T. (2007). “Links between justice, satisfaction and performance in the 782 
workplace.” J. Manag. Dev. 26 (4), 294-311. 783 
Suprapto, M., Bakker, H.L., Mooi, H.G. and Hertogh, M.J. (2016). “How do contract types and 784 
incentives matter to project performance?” Int. J. Proj. Manag. 34(6), 1071-1087. 785 
Teng, Y., Li, X., Wu, P. and Wang, X. (2019). “Using cooperative game theory to determine 786 
profit distribution in IPD projects.” International Journal of Construction Management, 787 
19(1), 32-45. 788 
Thompson, R.L., Smith, H.J. and Iacovou, C.L. (2007). “The linkage between reporting quality 789 
and performance in IS projects.” Info. Manag. 44(2), 196-205. 790 
Wang, Y., Chen, Y., Fu, Y., & Zhang, W. (2017). “Do prior interactions breed cooperation in 791 
construction projects? The mediating role of contracts.”  Int. J. Proj. Manag. 35(4): 633-792 
646. 793 
Willamson, O.E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism, Free Press, New York. 794 
Williamson, O.E. (1993). “Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization.” J. Law Econ. 795 
36(1, Part 2), 453-486. 796 
Williston, S., and C. M. Lewis (1920). Vol. 1 of The law of contracts. New York: Baker, 797 
Voorhis. 798 
Wu, G., Zhao, X. and Zuo, J. (2017). “Relationship between project’s added value and the 799 
trust–conflict interaction among project teams.” J. Manag. Eng. 33(4), 04017011. 800 
Wuyts, S., and Geyskens, I. (2005). “The formation of buyer-supplier relationships: Detailed 801 
contract drafting and close partner selection.” J. Market., 69(4), 103–117. 802 
You, J., Chen, Y., Wang, W. and Shi, C. (2018). “Uncertainty, opportunistic behavior, and 803 
governance in construction projects: The efficacy of contracts.”  Int. J. Proj. Manag. 36(5), 804 
795-807. 805 
Zaheer, A., B. McEvily, and Perrone, V. (1998). “Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of 806 
interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance.” Organ. Sci. 9 (2): 141–159.  807 
Zheng, L., Lu, W., Chen, K., Chau, K.W. and Niu, Y. (2017). “Benefit sharing for BIM 808 
implementation: Tackling the moral hazard dilemma in inter-firm cooperation.” Int. J. Proj. 809 
Manag. 35(3), 393-405.  810 
Table 1. Measurement of key constructs 811 
No.  Variables/ 
Code 











CON_ 1 The contract specified right to audit for 





CON_ 2 The contract stipulated damages against the 
party which failed to conform to the obligations 




CON_ 3 The contract provided provisions for controlling 
and monitoring BIM deliverables. 
Lumineau and 
Henderson (2012) 
 CON_ 4 The contract specified resolution for 
nonconformance to the terms and conditions of 













COR_ 2 The contract provided operational coordination 
for parties to discuss the necessary adjustments 
that need to make on BIM upon completion of 




COR_ 3 The contract provided strategic coordination for 
parties to sharpen the second-stage specific 
objectives of BIM development through mutual 





COR_ 4 The contract provided dispute resolution 
provisions to deal with the conflicts arising from 








COA_ 1 The contract provided provisions that required 
revisions/updates of BIM in conjunction with 
the variations/changes to the works. 
Wang et al. (2017) 
 
COA_ 2 The contract provided principles or guidelines 
for handling unforeseen circumstances arising 
from developing, using and maintaining BIM. 
Wang et al. (2017) 
 
COA_ 3 The contract provided solutions for responding 
to various contingencies arising from 
developing, using and maintaining BIM. 
Wang et al. (2017) 
 COA_ 4 The contract specified procedures for changes 
made in BIM. 
 
Quanji et al. (2016) 
 




CAL_ 1 Considering risks and rewards, we believed the 
other party would behave honestly in dealing 
with us. 
Poppo et al. (2016) 
 
CAL_ 2 Taking into account the high cost of misconduct, 
we believed the other party would behave 
trustworthily in performing the works. 
Poppo et al. (2016) 
 
CAL_ 3 We believed the other party would act 
professionally and competently in performing 
the works. 
Poppo et al. (2016) 
 CAL_ 4 We expected the relationship with the other 
party would continue for a long time. 
 
Wu et al (2017) 




REL_ 1 Both of us were confident that our interests 
would be protected because we shared a 
common identity. 
Poppo et al (2016) 
 
REL_ 2 We believed the other party would act 
effectively for us because we shared the same 
understanding of what matters. 
Poppo et al (2016) 
 
REL_ 3 We believed the other party would be willing to 
share information with us given that both of us 
shared the common objectives. 
Poppo et al (2016) 
 REL_ 4 Both of us would be willing to look for a joint 
solution to a problem arising in the project 
because we shared the common objectives. 
Poppo et al (2016) 
    




DIS_ 1 We believed monitoring of vulnerabilities (e.g. 
potential leakage of valuable knowledge) would 
safeguard our interest in the project. 
Lumineau (2017) 
 
DIS_ 2 We believed healthy suspicion of the other party 
would protect us against potential opportunism. 
Lumineau (2017) 
 
DIS_ 3 We supported vigilance against the other party. Lumineau (2017) 
 
DIS_ 4 We believed constructive scepticism of the other 






Perceived Fairness (PF) 
 
 








Our remuneration was commensurate with our 
ability, effort, input, and experience. 
We were provided with adequate resources to 
execute our work effectively. 
The risks that we were required to bear were 
equitable and commensurate with our capability 
to cope with them. 
We were paid equitably for the job that we 
completed. 
Lim and Loosemore 
(2017) 
Lim and Loosemore 
(2017) 
Lim and Loosemore 
(2017) 
Lim and Loosemore 
(2017) 
 








In general, the project team members were very 
satisfied with their work. 
Thompson et al 
(2007)  
The project outcome added value to the business 
operations of our firm. 
Thompson et al 
(2007) 
 
PP_ 3 The rate of the project met the schedule as 
compared to other projects. 
Thompson et al 
(2007) 
 
PP_ 4 The rate of the project met the budget as 
compared to other projects. 
Thompson et al 
(2007) 
 
PP_ 5 The rate of the project met the quality of the 
produced work as compared to other projects. 
Thompson et al 
(2007) 
 PP_ 6 The rate of the effectiveness of team members’ 
interactions as compared to other projects. 
Thompson et al 
(2007) 
 PP_ 7 The rate of the project met the health and safety 
expectations as compared to other projects. 
Suprapto et al. 
(2016) 
 812 
  813 
Table 2. Results summary of reflective measurement models 814 









CON_ 1 0.801 0.823 0.883 0.653 
CON_ 3 0.841    




COR_ 2 0.864 0.831 0.888 0.665 




COA_ 1 0.818 0.857 0.903 0.699 
COA_ 2 0.834    
COA_ 3 0.840    




CON_ 1 0.672  0.927 0.937 0.556 
CON_ 3 0.766    
CON_ 4 0.770    
COR_ 2 0.779    
COR_ 3 0.763    
COA_ 1 0.785    
COA_ 2 0.768    
COA_ 3 0.754    
COA_ 4 0.793    
Calculative 
Trust (CAL) 
CAL_ 1 0.767 0.777 0.857 0.601 
CAL_ 2 0.779    
CAL_ 3 0.843    
 815 
CAL_ 4 0.704     
Relational Trust 
(REL) 
REL_ 1 0.798 0.811 0.876 0.639 
REL_ 2 0.858    
REL_ 3 0.801    
REL_ 4 0.736    
Calculative 
Distrust (DIS) 
DIS_ 1 0.793 0.745 0.824 0.540 
DIS_ 2 0.751     
DIS_ 3 0.718     
DIS_ 4 0.673     
Perceived 
Fairness (PF) 
PF_ 1 0.734 0.795 0.867 0.620 
PF_ 2 0.819    
PF_ 3 0.776    




PP_ 1 0.729 0.840 0.879 0.509 




   
 PP_ 4 0.708    
 PP_ 5 0.758    
 PP_ 6 0.735    
 PP_ 7 0.649    
Table 3. Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) 
  CAL COA CON COR DIS PF PP REL 
CAL                 
COA 0.255               
CON 0.144 0.838             
COR 0.255 0.950 0.847           
DIS 0.257 0.285 0.248 0.269         
PF 0.472 0.377 0.295 0.291 0.317       
PP 0.510 0.255 0.166 0.233 0.196 0.694     
REL 0.859 0.379 0.219 0.392 0.352 0.536 0.536   
 816 
  817 
Table 4. Effect size f2 818 
  CAL DIS PF PP REL 
CAL       0.030   
DIS       0.000   
FUNC 0.010 0.028 0.102 0.009 0.046 
PF 0.127 0.048     0.165 
PP           
REL       0.047   
  819 
  820 

















H1: FUNC -> PP 0.090 1.414 ns 0.157 -0.013 0.196 
Total effect 
H1: FUNC -> PP 0.227 3.215 *** 0.001 0.117 0.349 
Indirect effect 
H1: FUNC -> PP 0.136 3.970 *** 0.000 0.087 0.199 
H2: FUNC -> CAL -> 
PP 
0.230 1.142 ns 0.253 -0.001 0.062 
H3: FUNC -> REL -> 
PP 
0.058 2.668 *** 0.008 0.025 0.096 
H4: FUNC -> DIS -> 
PP 
0.001 0.083 ns 0.934 -0.019 0.022 
H5: FUNC -> PF -> 
CAL -> PP 
0.023 1.720 * 0.085 0.006 0.049 
H6: FUNC -> PF -> 
REL -> PP 
0.031 2.505 ** 0.012 0.013 0.055 
H7: FUNC -> PF -> 
DIS -> PP 
0.000 0.081 ns 0.935 -0.006 0.010 
Note: *, **, *** and ns indicate a significance level of p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 and no significance, respectively based 822 
on bootstrapping of 5,000 subsamples.  823 



















FUNC -> DIS Contract 
value  
0.081 2.549 ** 0.011 0.043 0.129 
FUNC -> REL Project 
location 
-0.400 2.234 ** 0.026 -0.072 0.635 
FUNC -> PP Project 
duration 
0.251 2.406 ** 0.017 0.108 0.400 
FUNC -> DIS Project 
duration 
0.296 3.350 *** 0.001 0.178 0.456 
   825 
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